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A RIGHT TO DEMOCRACY IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: ITS 
IMPLICATIONS FOR ASIA 
SAME V ARA YUDEJ· 
I. INTRODUCTION 
International law has traditionally been neutral towards the concept of an 
entitlement to democracy. I As a result of ideological tensions during the 
Cold War, the international legal engagement with such a concept re-
mained elusive and uncertain. In this period, the relationship between 
international law and the concept of democracy attracted very little atten-
tion among international legal scholars. The demise of communism at 
the end of the Cold War has, however, placed liberal democracy - as the 
sole legitimate system of government - back on the international agenda. 
This paper will first look at the traditional concept of sovereignty and the 
undemocratic features of traditional international law. It will then dis-
* Dr. Same Varayudej, LL.B. (Thammasart University; LL.M., Ph.D.; currently a Lecturer in 
Law at the University of New England School of Law, Australia. 'This paper was presented to the 
GGU Students [Society of] International Law Association while the author was a Visiting Scholar at 
Golden Gate University School of Law, San Francisco, in the Fall of 2005. 
I. The term 'democracy' literally means "rule by people." Democratic governance denotes: 
effective participation, voting equality, rule of law, separation of powers, and individual rights. 
There are at least three competing models of democracy: liberal democracy, deliberative democracy 
and cosmopolitan democracy. For liberal democracy, see Amartya Sen, Democracy as a Universal 
Value 10 JOURNAL OF DEMOCRACY 3 (1999) and KATHERINE FIERLBECK, GLOBALIZING 
DEMOCRACY 87-118 (1998). On deliberative democracy, see Jurgen Habermas, Three Normative 
Models of Democracy, in DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE 21-30 (S. Benhabib ed., 1996); Seyla 
Benhabib, Towards a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy, in DEMOCRACY AND 
DIFFERENCE 67-94 (S Benhabib ed., 1996). On cosmopolitan democracy, see DAVID HELD, 
DEMOCRACY AND THE GLOBAL ORDER: FROM THE MODERN STATE TO COSMOPOLITAN 
GoVERNANCE 3-27 (1995). 
1
Varayudej: A Right to Democracy in Asia
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2006
2 ANNUAL SURVEY OF INT'L & COMPo LAW [Vol. XII 
cuss the development of democratic governance in the United Nations 
and regional international organisations, as well as the pro-democratic 
interventions in international law. Moreover, the paper will critically 
analyse the recent claims by prominent international legal scholars that a 
"right to democracy" is now emerging in international law and that all 
communities are entitled to democratic rules of governance. It will then 
consider whether, and to what extent, the notion of democratic entitle-
ment has crystallised into a customary rule of international law. The 
paper will finally assess the implications of the right to democracy on 
Asian cultural and social values. The aim of this paper is not to provide 
any definitive answers, but to raise some questions relevant to future 
debate on the emergence of democratic entitlement. 
II. THE TRADITIONAL CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY AND 
UNDEMOCRATIC CHARACTER OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
A. TRADITIONAL CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY 
Under the positivist consent theory, international law is a system of rules 
which sovereign States accepted or consented to be binding on them 
through conventional or customary law.2 From this perspective, interna-
tionallaw is traditionally based on the principle of equality of sovereign 
States, which gives a sovereign State an exclusive right to exercise pow-
ers with respect to its territory, citizens and resources. International law, 
as a law of coordination, thus prohibits any external patronising or inter-
vention in equal, independent States. This non-intervention principle - a 
correlative duty to the rights of sovereignty - is enshrined in Article 2(7) 
of the UN Charter, which states that the Charter gives no competence to 
the UN, or to the UN Members, to intervene in matters that are essen-
tially under the national jurisdiction of a State.3 According to Article 
2(7) of the UN Charter, States are not authorized to impose democracy 
by forcible means, since the choice on a constitutional model is clearly a 
matter which is essentially within the national jurisdiction. Thus, any 
attempt by democratic States to impose by force a democratic model on 
2. In its judgment in the Lotus case, [1927] PCU, ser. A, no. 10, at 19, the Permanent Court of 
International Justice made the famous observation that: 
[t]he rules of law biding upon States therefore emanate from their own free will as ex-
pressed in conventions or by usages generally accepted as expressing principles of law 
and established in order to regulate the relations between these co-existing independent 
communities or with a view to achieve a common aims. Restriction upon independent 
States therefore cannot be presumed. 
3. See also, the prohibition to intervene in the Declaration on Principles of International Low 
Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of 
the United Nations, annex to UNGA Res. 2625 (XXV) of 24 October 1970. 
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so-called "non-democratic" States would be in violation of the principles 
of sovereign equality and non-intervention. 
This is exactly the point that the International Court of Justice (IeJ) 
made in the Nicaragua (Merits) case.4 In that case, the ICJ considered 
and then rejected the United States' argument that there was a right of 
intervention, with or without armed force, in support of "political or 
moral values" of an internal opposition in another State.s The Court also 
rejected the finding of the United States Congress that Nicaragua had 
taken a "significant step towards establishing a totalitarian Communist 
dictatorship," and went on to hold that the adherence by Nicaragua to a 
particular form of government "does not constitute a violation of cus-
tomary international law," because, in the Court's view, there was no 
right of intervention by a State against another on the ground that the 
latter had chosen a "particular ideology or political system."6 
The principles of sovereign equality and non-intervention in domestic 
affairs thus constitute significant obstacles to the development of the 
principle of democracy into the corpus of international law. As will be 
discussed in detail below, despite the rights of sovereignty and the duty 
of non-intervention, it has been argued that these principles are not abso-
lute. In fact there are a number of events, which are indicative of a shift 
in the relationship between the concept of State sovereignty and non-
intervention on the one hand, and human rights and humanitarian inter-
vention (including pro-democratic intervention) on the other hand. 
B. UNDEMOCRATIC CHARACTERISTICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The characteristics of traditional international law - based the concept of 
sovereignty and sovereign equality - have been described as fundamen-
tally "undemocratic" As James Crawford, a prominent international 
lawyer, rightly observed/ international law presumes that: 
(l)the executive has comprehensive power in agreeing to rules 
of international law which could affect individual rights without 
their knowledge or consent;8 
4. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v U.S.) (Merits) 
[1986] ICJ Reports 14. 
5. Id., at 108. 
6. Id., at 133. 
7. James Crawford, Democracy and International Law, 64 BRITISH Y.B. lNT'L L., 113, 117-
119 (1994). 
8. See, eg., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, (opened for signature 23 May 1969), 
1155 V.N.T.S. 331, art. 7(2)(a). 
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(2) decisions resulting from democratic processes are not accept-
able reasons for any failure to comply with international obliga-
tions;9 
(3) individuals have no legal standing or procedural rights under 
international law; 
(4) the principle of non-intervention protects both democratic and 
non-democratic regimes; 
(5) the principle of self-determination can not change the estab-
lished territorial boundaries (uti possidetis juris); 
(6) a successor government is bound by the acts of its predeces-
sor irrespective of the latter's legitimacy or constitutionality. 10 
In addition, traditional international law did not concern itself with the 
democratic character of sovereign States since democratic governance 
was not a criterion of statehood. ll Nor did the UN Charter require its 
members to adopt a model of democratic governance. 12 Similarly, the 
UN Security Council does not operate on the democratic principle, given 
the fact that the five pennanent members of the Council have a veto right 
over non-procedural decisions,13 including those relating to admission of 
a State to membership,14 enforcement measures under Chapter VII of the 
UN Charterl5 and refonns of the Security Council. I6 The exclusive char-
acter of the permanent members' veto power has recently been a subject 
of debate concerning the refonn of the Security Council. This veto 
power is regarded as "an anathema to any notion of democracy"17 since it 
9. Id., arts. 27 and 46. 
10. Tinoco Arbitration 1 R.LA.A. 369 (1923). 
11. Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States 1933, 165 L.N.T.S. 19 (1934). 
Articles of the Convention set out the following criteria for statehood: (a) a pennanent population; 
(b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with other States. 
There are some who suggest that these criteria have been supplemented by the requirements that 
statehood must be achieved in accordance with the principle of self -detennination and the funda-
mental human rights nonns outlawing apartheid or racist policies. See D. J. HARRIS, CASES AND 
MATERIALS IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 99 (6th ed, 2004), citing cases of the Southern Rhodesia declar-
ing its independence in 1965 and the Union of South Africa granting independence to the Transkei, 
the homeland of the Xhosa people, in 1976. 
12. See UN Charter, art. 4, which provides: "Membership in the United Nations is open to all 
other peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter ... " 
13. /d., art. 27(3). 
14. /d., art. 4. 
15. Id., arts. 39,41 and 42. 
16. Id., art. 109(2). 
17. Statement by Chuchai Kasemsam, Thailand's representative to the UN, UNGA 56th Sess., 
35th plenary meeting, UN Press Release GN9944 (31/10/2001). 
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is inconsistent with "the principles of equal rights and self-determination 
of peoples" enunciated in Article 2(1) of the Charter. IS 
These "undemocratic" features are embedded in the body of international 
law because, as Crawford points out, the international legal system 
"seeks to advance at the same time a range of partly incompatible goals," 
such as the maintenance of international peace and security, the princi-
ples of non-use of force, the principles of non-intervention in matters 
within domestic jurisdiction of any State, respect for human rights and 
self-determination of peoples, and security of international agreements. 19 
In doing so, international law aims to apply these principles to States on 
a universal basis, irrespective of whether their political systems are de-
mocratic.20 
This does not mean, however, that international law opposes the notion 
of democracy. It means simply that "international law does not generally 
address domestic constitutional issues."21 From the historical perspec-
tive, especially during the Cold War, international law was to remain 
neutral, vis-a-vis the internal character of any political model, since the 
latter was within the domain of politics and domestic law, rather the do-
main of internationallaw.22 Mter the collapse of the communist regimes 
in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union between 1989 and 1991, the 
neutral position of international law, vis-a-vis a State's internal form of 
government, appears to have shifted away from the traditional concept of 
State sovereignty - sovereignty that resides with States regardless of 
their constitutional arrangement - and towards a concept of popular sov-
ereignty based on popular consent of citizens.23 
Globalisation also has a significant impact upon traditional international 
law and the concept of national sovereignty through global economic 
integration in trade and investment.24 For instance, through trade liber-
alisation and foreign direct investment, multinational corporations have 
increasingly gained political negotiation power and privileges extracted 
18. HANs KOCHLER, DEMOCRACY AND THE INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW: PROPOSITIONS 
FOR AN ALTERNATIVE WORLD ORDER 90 (1995). 
19. Id. art. I, stating these incompatible principles are the purpose of the United Nations. 
20. James Crawford, Democracy in International Law - A Reprise, in DEMOCRATIC 
GoVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 114, 1I5 (G. H. Fox & B. R. Roth eds., 2000). 
21. American Law Institute, Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United 
States, § 203, comment e. (1987). 
22. Jan Wouters, Bart De Meester and Cedric Ryngaert, Democracy and International Law 5 
(Working Paper No.5, 2004) <http://www.law.kuleuven.ac.beliir/nUwpIWPIWPLirg5.pdf>. 
23. Gregory H. Fox, The Right to Political Participation in International Law, in 
DEMOCRATIC GoVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 20, at 49. 
24. On this topic, see Jagdish Bhagwati, Globalisation, Sovereignty, and Democracy, in 
DEMOCRACY'S VICTORY AND CRISIS 263 (1997). 
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from the developing countries.25 Regulation of global problems, such as 
global warming, international terrorism, drug trafficking, weapons of 
mass destruction and serious human rights violations, have now ex-
panded beyond the national jurisdiction of a State.26 
ITI. DEVELOPMENT OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN THE 
UNITED NATIONS AND REGIONAL INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANISATIONS 
With the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, a clear victory for lib-
eral democracy was proclaimed as the dominant ideology in the world.27 
The triumph of democracy implied a demise of Communism, Fascism 
and other ideological anti-democratic forces. This "victory" for liberal 
democracy in tum led some international scholars to believe that there is 
a right to democracy in international human rights law, and the existence 
of democracy as an influential principle in many areas of public interna-
tionallaw.28 Since then, there has been a great deal of debate regarding 
the relationship of democracy and international law among international 
lawyers and political scientists.29 
A. SHIFf IN THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY 
After the Cold War, the international agenda for ensuring human rights, 
such as democratic entitlement, has gained momentum given that there 
appears to be an increasing awareness of the interdependence among 
societies as well as of the interconnection of global challenges. This 
awareness has led to a more integrated approach of solving global chal-
lenges concerning international peace and security, global warming, hu-
25. JOSEPH STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 67-73 (2003). 
26. For ethical and legal issues surrounding globalisation, see PETER SINGER, ONE WORW: 
THE ETHICS OF GLOBALISATION (2002). 
27. See F FuKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (London: Hamilton, 1992). 
On the definition of democracy, Fukuyama concluded that "[a] country is democratic if it grants its 
people the right to choose their own government through periodic, secret-ballot, mUlti-party elec-
tions, on the basis of universal and equal adult suffrage." /d., 43. But see S. Marks, The End of 
History? Reflections on Some InteT7Ultionai Theses, 8 EUR. J. lNT'L L. 449, 454 (1997), who pointed 
out that Fukuyama's definition of democracy "fails to consider the diversity of values and beliefs 
that contributes to producing divergent understandings of the meaning of liberalism and democracy, 
and of their interrelation. Liberal democracy cannot spell the end of ideological struggle because it is 
itself the subject of ideological contestation, and will continue to be so." 
28. T. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic GoveT7Ulnce, 86 A.J.I.L. 46 (1992); A.M. 
Slaughter, InteT7Ultional Law in a World of Liberal States, 6 EUR. J.INT'L L. 503 (1995). 
29. Franck, supra note 28, at 46; Fox, supra note 23, at 48-90; James Crawford, Democracy 
and the Body of International Law, in DEMOCRATIC GoVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, 
supra note 20, at 91-120; Roland Rich, Bringing Democracy into lnteT7Ultionai Law, 12(3) J. 
DEMOCRACY 20-34 (2001). 
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man rights and governance.30 It appears that States are now expected to 
comply with basic democratic standards because there appears to be 
widespread support in the international community of interdependent 
nations for ensuring the protection of fundamental human rights. This 
support is derived primarily from the actions of international organiza-
tions together with individuals and non-governmental organizations call-
ing for greater participation in the governance processes that impact peo-
ples' lives.3! 
This development has led some American scholars to argue that there is a 
shift from the traditional principles of sovereignty and non-intervention 
in favour of human rights, including a right to democratic governance, 
and humanitarian intervention. Some went even further in asserting that 
international law allows a powerful nation to unilaterally liberate a peo-
ple from a despotic government in another State.32 
Thomas Franck is the first prominent international lawyer to elucidate 
the idea that democratic governance has evolved from moral prescription 
into an international legal norm. 33 According to Frank, three recent oc-
currences are positive indications of the emergent right to governance: 
first, the failure of the August 1991 attempted coup in the former Soviet 
Union; second, the UN General Assembly Resolution of October 11, 
1991 to restore Jean Bertrand Aristide, the then-ousted Haitian President; 
and third, the proliferation of more than 110 States in late 1991 commit-
ted to "open, mUltiparty, secret-ballot elections with a universal fran-
chise," even though some of them are democratic in form rather than in 
substance.34 
Since 1992, there is a good deal of support in the literature for bringing 
the concept of democracy into internationallaw.35 There is, however, a 
30. Miguel Gonzalez Marcos, Living Short of Paradise, in PREsENTATION OF THE FiNDINGS OF 
THE LITERATURE REVIEW 2-3 (2004). <http://www.boell.de/downloads/verfassunglmiguel 
gonzales marcos 3.pdf> (last visited 20 Dec. 2005). 
31. D. Held, Cosmopolitan Democracy and the Global Order: Reflections on the 200th Anni-
versary of Kant's "Perpetual Peace" 20 ALTERNATIVES 427 (1995); L. Diamond, Promoting De-
mocracy in the I990s: Actors and Instruments, Issues and Imperatives 29 (Report to the Carnegie 
Commission, 1995). 
32. See discussion on pro-democratic intervention in sub-section C below. 
33. Franck, supra note 28, at 46. 
34. Id., at 46-47, cited in Makua Wa Mutua, Politics and Human Rights: An Essential Symbio-
sis, in THE ROLE OF LAW IN OOERNATIONALPOLITICS 165 (2000). 
35. See Franck, supra note 28, at 46 and Legitimacy and the Democratic Entitlement, in 
DEMOCRATIC GoVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 20, at 25; Gregory H. Fox, The 
Right to Political Participation in International Law, in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, at 48; Roland Rich, supra note 29, at 20; R Burchill, International Law of 
Democracy and the Constitutional Future of the EU: Contributions and Expectations (Queen's 
Papers on Europeanisation No. 3/2003) 2-3. 
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good deal of skepticism in accepting that the concept of democratic gov-
ernance has emerged as a right in international law or that democratic 
governance is the most suited form of ordering society.36 In the next 
section, the paper will identify the development of a right to democratic 
governance through the practices in of the United Nations and regional 
institutions. 
B. THE DEVELOPMENT OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE THROUGH 
PRACTICES IN THE UNITED NATIONS AND REGIONAL 
ORGANISATIONS 
The foundation of a right to democratic governance has long been set out 
in human rights instruments, particularly the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) which provides in Article 25 that 
every citizen has the right to take part in the conduct of public affairs, 
directly or through freely chosen representatives.37 In addition, the Uni-
versal Declaration on Human Rights of 1948 also provides, in Article 21, 
that "the will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of govern-
ment."38 The language of Article 25 of the ICCPR can be found at a re-
gional level in Article 3 of Protocol I of the European Convention on 
Human Rights,39 and in Article 23 of the America Convention on Human 
Rights.40 However, during the Cold War confrontation, Article 25 of the 
ICCPR was not given its ordinary and natural meaning, and single-party 
states were able to put on electoral displays that they claimed met the 
standards set in the Covenant. 
It was not until 1996 that the United Nations Human Rights Committee, 
a body of experts established by the ICCPR, adopted General Comment 
25, which elaborated on the rights enshrined in Article 25. The General 
Comment's interpretation of Article 25 represents a considerable 
strengthening of the democratic ideal; applied correctly, its provisions 
would ensure free and fair elections. It requires freedom of expression, 
assembly, and association (paragraph 12); enshrines non-discrimination 
with respect to the citizen's right to vote (paragraph 3); rejects any condi-
36. See Brad R. Roth, Evaluating Democratic Progress, in DEMOCRATIC GoVERNANCE AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 20, at 493; Susan Marks, International Law. Democracy and The 
End of History. in DEMOCRATIC GoVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, at 532; Russell A. 
Miller, Self-Determination in International Law and the Demise of Democracy? 41 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT'L L' 601 (2003). 
37. 999 U.N.T.S. 171. As of 24 November 2004, there are 154 parties to the ICCPR. 
38. UNGA Res. 217A(III), 10 December 1948. 
39. European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), Protocol I, opened for signature 20 
March 1952,213 U.N.T.S. 262. 
40. American Convention on Human Rights, opened for signature 22 November 1969 (AMR), 
(1970) 9 ILM 673. 
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tion of eligibility to vote or stand for office based on political affiliation 
(paragraph 15); calls for voters to be free to support or oppose the gov-
ernment without undue influence or coercion of any kind (paragraph 19); 
and requires states reporting under the Covenant to explain how the dif-
ferent political views in the community are represented in elected bodies 
(paragraph 22). The General Comment provides a jurisprudence that 
gives teeth to the Covenant's obligation to hold "genuine periodic elec-
tions." It establishes a checklist that, if followed, will result in a func-
tioning electoral democracy and, if combined with adherence to the other 
obligations in the basic human rights treaties, a functioning liberal de-
mocracy.41 
In the same year, the right to democracy gained extra momentum when 
UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali submitted An Agenda for 
Democratization to the General Assembly. Boutros-Ghali was convinced 
that a right to democracy existed and intended, through the Agenda, to 
clarify the opinio juris which is required to have a new customary inter-
national norm established.42 In the Agenda for Democratization, 
Boutros-Ghali pointed out that the purpose and principles of the United 
Nations were to promote democracy and that the non-intervention prin-
ciple of Article 2(7) of the Charter does not aim to enforce national mod-
els of democracy, but rather to provide support and advice to nations 
concerning democratization.43 
In 1999, the UN Commission on Human Rights adopted a resolution 
entitled "A Right to Democracy."44 The resolution itself was adopted 
unanimously, but its title was the object of fierce debate. A Cuban pro-
posal to remove the "Right to Democracy" from the title was only nar-
rowly rejected by the majority with 28 votes for, 12 against and 13 ab-
stentions. In their opposition to the "Right to Democracy," developing 
countries in particular expressed fear of foreign intervention into domes-
tic affairs. For example, the Indian delegate pointed out that "a form of 
government rising from the people ... [cannot] be proposed from outside," 
and Pakistan expressed concerns that the "Right to Democracy" might be 
used to validate foreign occupation. Criticising the term "Right to De-
mocracy" as "premature and not balanced," China insisted that, taking 
into account the disparate historical backgrounds, different forms of de-
41. Rich, supra note 21, at 23. 
42. B. Boutros-Gha1i, An Agenda for Democratization, Supplement to the Reports N50/332 
and N51/512 on Democratization, 17 December 1996, § 18; cited in Wouters, et aI., supra note 12, 
at 9. 
43. [d., § 41. 
44. UN Doc. EI.CN.411999/L.55/Rev.2. 
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mocracy are possible.45 The resistance to the title of the resolution 
clearly indicated that there was no agreement on a right to democracy at 
the international level. 
While the provisions of the cited international instruments promoted 
certain aspects of the concept of democratic governance, they did not 
necessarily entail an emergence of a right to democracy in general inter-
national law because sovereignty and non-intervention into domestic 
affairs were emphasised in all such instruments. 
C. PRO-DEMOCRATIC INTERVENTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Political debate in the past decade seems to have revolved around the 
questions of whether people have a right to democracy and, if so, 
whether democracy may be imposed from outside. This theory of "pro-
democratic intervention" thus poses significant problems under general 
international law, which prohibits the use of force in international rela-
tions, except in the case of self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Char-
ter or after authorization by the Security Council pursuant to Chapter vn 
of the UN Charter. 
In favour of pro-democratic intervention, W. Michael Reisman argues 
that under modem international law, popular sovereignty has trumped 
State sovereignty. Reisman argues that a right to democracy pierces sov-
ereignty's abstract veil and vests true sovereignty in the citizens of a 
State.46 Similarly, Anthony D' Amato contends that international law is 
about people and not about States.47 The proponents of this view often 
cite the invasions of Grenada and Panama as examples. 
Regarding the Grenada invasion, the United States did not rely on an 
expanded view of self-defence, new interpretations of Article 2(4) of the 
UN Charter, or a broad doctrine of humanitarian intervention. Instead, 
the United States acted upon the invitation of the Governor-General of 
Grenada, upon a request to intervene from the Organization of Eastern 
Caribbean States, and for the protection of nationals.48 Yet, this pro-
democratic intervention failed to gain support from most international 
legal commentators.49 Nor was it supported by State practice, since it is 
45. Commission on Human Rights, press notice, HRlCN/99/61, 27 April 1999. 
46. See W. Michael Reisman, Coercion and Self-Determination: Construing Chaner Anicle 2 
(4) 78 A.J.I.L. 642, 645 (1984). 
47. See A. D' Amato, U.S. Forces in Panama: Defenders, Aggressors or Human Rights Activ-
ists? The Invasion of Panama was a Lawful Response to Tyranny 84 AJ.I.L. 516 (1990). 
48. Wouters, et ai., supra note 12, at 27. 
49. See M. Byers and S. Chesterman, "You the People": Pro-democratic Invention in Interna-
tional Law, in DEMOCRATIC GoVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 20, at 259-292. 
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clear that pro-democratic intervention would be in violation of the fun-
damental principles of international law as enshrined in Articles 2 (4) 
and 2 (7) of the UN Charter. 
As for the Panama invasion, the United States again relied officially on 
other legal justifications, such as the protection of American nationals 
under Article 51 of the UN Charter; the fight against drug trafficking; 
and the protection of the integrity of the Panama Canal Treaty . Yet their 
list of justifications, also features - although not in the first place - sup-
port of democracy. The pro-democratic intervention was immediately 
opposed by an international community united in the UN General As-
sembly, which condemned the intervention in Panama as "a flagrant vio-
lation of international law and of the independence, sovereignty and ter-
ritorial integrity of States," thereby explicitly referring to Article 2(4) of 
the UN Charter. 50 
Another example which has been used to support pro-democratic inter-
vention is the Haiti invasion. In 1993, the Security Council imposed an 
economic embargo on Haiti, after its democratically elected President 
Aristide was overthrown by a military junta in 1991. The Council de-
plored that, "despite the efforts of the international community, the le-
gitimate Government of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide ha[d] not been 
reinstated." The Council was also concerned "that the persistence of this 
situation contribute[d] to a climate of fear of persecution and economic 
dislocation which could increase the number of Haitians seeking refuge 
in neighbouring Member States." 
After the embargo failed to force the coup leaders to step down, the Se-
curity Council authorized the UN Member States to form a multinational 
force under unified command and control and, in this framework, to use 
all necessary means to facilitate the departure from Haiti of the military 
leadership and the prompt return of the legitimately elected President. A 
force, mainly consisting of United States troops, acted upon the UN 
mandate and re-instated President Aristide. While successful, it remains 
arguable whether or not the Haiti intervention set a determinative prece-
dent for pro-democratic intervention, since the Security Council appears 
to have listed the action in its resolutions as a case of humanitarian rather 
than pro-democratic intervention.51 
The conflicts in Afghanistan and more recently Iraq have focused atten-
tion yet again on the foreign policies of powerful States, especially the 
50. UNGA Res. 441240 (1989). 
51. Wouters, et aI., supra notes 12, at 30. 
11
Varayudej: A Right to Democracy in Asia
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2006
12 ANNUAL SURVEY OF INT'L & COMPo LAW [Vol. xn 
U.S., to effect regime change in dictatorial or undemocratic states by 
armed intervention. Little attention has, however, been given to the fact 
that - whatever the positive aspects of the removal of the regimes of the 
Taliban in Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein in Iraq - bringing about a 
regime change in another country violates a basic norm of international 
relations. This norm of non-intervention protects the right of peoples to 
determine their own political system without external interference. As 
W. Michael Reisman points out, the idea of intervention to liberate peo-
ple from a despotic government is "almost always a bad idea."52 Most 
commentators have agreed that "it is neither right nor practical to use 
foreign military force in order to create conditions for local democratic 
development. "53 Ghia Nodia argues that: 
• It is not right to impose democracy by armed force, because 
doing so undermines the international political order and may 
serve as a pretext for interventions motivated by selfish interests. 
• It is not practical because democracy emerges as a result of 
the internal societal and political developments: democracy is 
about choice and freedom, and these cannot be imposed.54 
In light of the history of forcible interventions, pro-democratic interven-
tion, unilaterally or collectively, is likely to entail failure for the interven-
ing States. 
IV. ASIAN VALUES AND DEMOCRACY 
Inherent to the debate over "Asian values" is the cultural relativity theory 
which argues that social actions must be evaluated according to standard 
which underline a particular culture, and that no standards of a society 
can be implanted successfully beyond cross-cultural boundaries. As a 
corollary of this theory, "societies which embrace a common cultural 
heritage can be said to have evolved discrete systems of political and 
social arrangements distinct from - and sometimes in opposition to or in 
conflict with - the rest of the world."55 The concept of "Asian values" 
thus implies that "the social, economic and political characteristics of 
52. w. Michael Reisman, The Manley O. Hudson Lecture: Why Regime Change is (Almost 
Always) a Bad Idea, 98 A.J.I.L. 516 (2004). 
53. Ghia Nodia, Democratic Promotion, in 3 TOWARDS A DEMOCRATIC REsPONSE 22-23 
(Club de Madrid Series on Democracy and Terrorism, 2(05), <bttp:llwww.safe-
democracy.orgldocslCdM-Series-on-Terrorism-Vol-3.pdf> (last visited on 20 December 2(05). 
54. Id. 
55. Takashi Inoguchi & Edward Newman, "Asian Values" and Democracy in Asia, Proceed-
ings of a Conference held on 28 March 1997 at Hamamatsu, Shizuoka, Japan. 
<http://www.unu.edulunupress/asian-values.html> (last visited on 20 December 2(05). 
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certain Asian countries are based upon a shared value system which is 
identifiable and distinct and which transcends national, religious and 
ideological differences."56 "Asian values" generally refer to Confucian-
ism, respects for elders, emphasis on order and social harmony, group 
orientation, and the collective interests of the society and State.57 
Relying on these cultural relativity arguments, a number of Asian politi-
cians, including Lee Kuan Yew, argued that Asians traditionally value 
the precepts of discipline, not political freedom, and thus the attitude to 
democracy must inevitably be much more skeptical in these countries. In 
his view, Western-style democracy is not applicable to East Asia.58 Lee 
Kuan Yew outlines "the fundamental difference between Western con-
cepts of society and government and East Asian concepts" by explaining, 
"when I say East Asians, I mean Korea, Japan, China, Vietnam, as dis-
tinct from Southeast Asia, which is a mix between the Sinic and the In-
dian, though Indian culture itself emphasizes similar values."59 
Amartya Sen, a former noble prize winner, took Lee Kuan Yew to the 
task in his famous article published in 1999.60 Sen argued that contrary 
to the general thesis of contrast between the West and Asia, which con-
centrates on the countries to the east of Thailand, there is in fact diversity 
throughout Asia, and it is a mistake to claim that the rest of Asia is rather 
"similar." Sen also pointed out that: 
[e]ven East Asia itself, however, is remarkably diverse, with 
many variations to be found not only among Japan, China, Ko-
rea, and other countries of the region, but also within each coun-
try. Confucius is the standard author quoted in interpreting Asian 
values, but he is not the only intellectual influence in these coun-
tries (in Japan, China, and Korea for example, there are very old 
and very widespread Buddhist traditions, powerful for over a 
millennium and a half.61 
Sen concluded that "[t]he monolithic interpretation of Asian values as 
hostile to democracy and political rights does not bear critical scrutiny."62 
56. [d. 
57. ALICE TA Y (ED.), EAST ASIA - HUMAN RIGHTS, NATION-BUILDING, TRADE 14-15 (1999). 
58. [d. at 14. 
59. Fareed Zakaria, Culture is Destiny: A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew, 73 FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS 113 (March-April 1994). 
60. Sen, supra note I, at 3-17. 
61. !d. at 14. 
62. [d. at IS. 
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Similarly, in his speech on Dynamism of Democracy in Asia,63 Roland 
Rich contends that: 
The error in the Asian Values argument was to translate different 
values to mean that Asians should have a different set of rights 
and a different form of governance. Universal rights deal with 
basic issues that flow from one's inherent dignity as a human be-
ing and they sit very comfortably with different cultural traits 
around the world. One of those universal values is everybody's 
right to participate in decisions that affect them as articulated in 
Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 
from it flows the basic reasoning for democratic forms of gov-
ernment. 
Robert Dahl, a prominent political theorist, points out, however, that 
"[e]ven if the United States and other democratic countries were to pur-
sue policies more favourable to the evolution of democracy in non-
democratic countries, however, changes in the essential conditions would 
be slow" since change depends on prior conditions, including cultural 
factors, and that "the root of sub-cultural conflicts are usually too deep to 
be eradicated by outside intervention."64 In these non-democratic coun-
tries, political and military leaders accustomed to using force to achieve 
their political ends are unlikely to give up their powers in the name of 
democracy, and this is what exactly happened in authoritarian States 
such as Myanmar. 
V. CONCLUSION 
While international law appears to have embraced the idea of democracy, 
it has not yet articulated a detailed normative framework or an extensive 
body of practical rules defining the meaning of democracy. A major 
problem with the notion of democratic governance is that no legal defini-
tion of 'democracy' has been generally agreed upon in State practice or 
in any international document. This leaves it subject to a variety of in-
terpretations, depending upon the persons providing the definition and 
63. ROLAND RICH, DYNAMISM OF DEMOCRACY IN ASIA (2002) 
<http://www.cdi.anu.edu.auJasia_pacificlasia_downloads/Asia-PDemo_speech_Aug02.doc> (last 
visited on 16 September 2(05). This speech is drawn from his chapter entitled Democracy in the 
Balance, in Julian Weiss' DGERS' ROAR- ASIA'S RECOVERY AND ITS IMPACf (2001). 
64. ROBERT DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 317 (1989). 
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the context in which they are speaking. This makes democracy an "es-
sentially contested concept."65 
At this stage of development, the right to democracy has been supported 
by the scant and inconsistent practice of powerful states and the very 
tentative articulation of such a right in international instruments on hu-
man rights since 1966.66 The proponents of the right to democratic gov-
ernance often use the concept of "democratic peace" to demonstrate the 
support of the existence, or the emergence, of a right to democratic gov-
ernance in international law. The premise is based upon a consequential-
ity theory which argues that democracy is desirable because democratic 
States are less likely to wage war. It is a very persuasive thesis but, in 
terms of customary international law, there is no evidence that support 
for peace implicitly provides the raisons d'etre for the existence of a 
right to democracy. Nor is there any evidence in State practice to sup-
port a right to use force to promote democracy or to liberate a people 
from a despotic government. 
It should be noted that while democracy is perhaps the most desirable 
mode of governance, there are still some flaws in the concept. Some 
common and persistent misconceptions need to be addressed. As David 
Beetham observed,67 the majority rule is not always or necessarily desir-
able if it leaves a minority out of the equation of governance. Democ-
ratic entitlement, as a part of human rights, should guarantee the protec-
tion of the rights of both the majority and minority. This is the aim of 
the ICCPR and other instruments. Democracy should be regarded as a 
device or guiding principle for resolving political conflict, but it is far 
from perfect. For this reason, special institutional arrangements may be 
needed to protect the rights of minorities and ensure them a due share in 
political and public office. Thus, diversity of societies in terms of socio-
economic development will require different democratic arrangements to 
fit their own circumstances, if democratic principles are to be effectively 
realised. These arrangements can be seen as different forms of power-
sharing which also guarantee that minorities participate in the polity. It 
should also be noted that since democracy has historically been associ-
ated with a market economy, the free market and trade liberalisation can 
adversely impact on human rights and democracy in developing coun-
tries due to their lack of appropriate social and economic structures, 
65. T. BALL AND R. DAGGER, POLITICAL IDEOWGIES AND THE DEMOCRATIC IDEAL 22-23 
(1991); K. Bollen, Political Democracy: Conceptual and Measurement Traps, in DEFINING AND 
MEASURING DEMOCRACY 5 (D. Beetham, ed., 1994). 
66. Crawford, supra note 20, at 115-116. 
67. See Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights submitted in accordance with 
Commission Resolution 2001/41, UN Doc. F/CN.4/2oo3/59 (27 January 2003). 
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technology, and resources to compete with the developed countries on an 
equal footing in international trade. 
The concept of democracy as a universal entitlement has increasingly 
received acceptance in the United Nations. At the recent 2005 World 
Summit, the United Nations General Assembly reiterated that "democ-
racy is a universal value based on the freely expressed will of people to 
determine their own political, economic, social and cultural systems and 
their full participation in all aspects of their lives."68 In renewing its 
commitment to support democracy, the Assembly adopted a decision to 
establish a "Democracy Fund,"69 which could provide valuable aid to 
developing nations to promote and consolidate democratic political sys-
tems, human rights and the rule of law. 
However, the idea of democracy should not be imposed on the peoples of 
developing countries externally by powerful nations. In order for the 
conception of democratic governance to take root and flourish, the de-
mocratization process must derive from the grass-root level of the society 
itself. Governments of powerful countries need to accept the fact that 
democracy and its traditions can not successfully established overnight. 
As Makau Wa Mutua observed in the context of Africa: 
The argument by current reformers that Africa merely needs a 
liberal democratic, rule-of-Iaw state to be freed from despotism 
is mistaken. The narrow transplantation of the narrow formula-
tion of Western liberalism cannot adequately respond to the his-
torical reality and the political and social needs of Africa. The 
sacralization of the individual and the supremacy of jurispru-
dence of individual rights in organized political and social soci-
ety is not a natural, 'transhistorical,' or universal phenomenon, 
applicable to all societies, without regard to time and place.70 
Promoting democracy through external intervention may also have a 
negative impact on the global environment for democratization in devel-
oping countries in Asia and other parts of the world, especially when 
such a promotion has been perceived as a policy of Western cultural im-
68. UN GAOR Doc. N601L.1 (15 September 2005) 31 [135]. To put a qualification on the 
idea of democratic governance, the General Assembly reaffirmed that "while democracies share 
common features, there is note single model of democracy," and emphasized "the necessity of due 
respect for sovereignty and the right for self-determination." 
69. [d. at [136]. The idea of establishing 'Democratic Loan Guarantee Fund' as a way for 
achieving democracy was also advocated by THOMAS POGGE, WORLD POVERTY AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS 158-160 (2002). 
70. Makau wa Mutua, The Banjul Charter and the African Cultural Fingerprint: An Evalua-
tion of Language of Duties, 35 VA. I.INT'LL. 339, 341 (1995). 
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perialism. It is well established that fundamental human rights norms, 
including the principle of self-determination and rules concerning protec-
tion from slavery and racial discrimination, transcend cultural values and 
are binding erga omnes.71 But the degree of cognisance and development 
of the notion of democratic entitlement may be conditioned by cultural 
factors. 
Finally, even if one could argue that a right to democratic governance 
may be emerging as a new category of human rights, this right is unlikely 
to prevail over the jus cogens norm enshrined in Article 2(4) of the UN 
Charter. Those who have supported the right of pro-democratic interven-
tion need to establish not only that a right to democratic entitlement is 
now accepted as a rule of customary international law by the interna-
tional community as a whole, but also that a right to democratic govern-
ance will necessarily entail the right of a State or 'coalition of the will-
ing' to use force to establish, maintain or restore a democratic regime in 
another State.72 State practice and opinio juris support neither of these 
claims. 
71. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. Case [1970] IC1 Reports 3, [33]-[34]; East 
Timor Case [1995] IC1 Reports 90,102. 
72. See CHRISTIAN GRAY, iNTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 39 (2000); Christian 
Pippan, "Regime Change" through Armed Intervention?: Democratic Legitimacy and the Use of 
Force in International Law (29 April 2003) <www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/ 
fellowsforum/pippan_paper.nf> (last visited on 20 December 2005). 
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